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H. R. 4721 (PROHIBITING COMMENT UPON THE
WEIGHT, SUFFICIENCY OR CREDIBILITY OF
THE EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF CASES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS)
M UCH to the surprise of the bench and bar, the lower
House of the last session of Congress, without a dis-
senting voice or vote, passed H. R. 4721, a Bill for-
bidding judges of the United States District Court to com-
ment on the evidence to the jury, a right which has been
exercised by judges of the federal trial couits since the
foundation of the government. There was no considerable
public sentiment which demanded this drastic change in our
federal trial system. The old method had worked well for a
century and a half serving to nullify frivolous and absurd
contentions of counsel which befogged real issues and misled
juries to the detriment of the administration of justice, and
yet the House passed this bill, and it is now pending in the
Senate. There is a substantial reason why popularly elected
judges exposed to the pressure of local sentiment should not
be permitted to comment to the jury upon the evidence, but
no reason at all why judges not dependent upon the favor
of the people for their tenure in office should not continue
to have this power and exercise this ancient practice.
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At the conclusion of a jury trial in federal court in which
many witnesses have testified, and, as often happens, the
questions of fact are complicated and involved, it is un-
doubtedly a great aid to the jury to have the presiding judge,
who has had a wide experience in weighing evidence on dis-
puted questions of fact, comment on the mass of evidence
pointing out what parts of it are important and what parts
comparatively unimportant, clarifying what was obscure, un-
tangling what was confused, and simplifying what seemed
complex. With this aid, juries are enabled to arrive at ver-
dicts which are more intelligent, and, hence, more just. This
function of the judge, instead of being an "invasion of the
province of the jury," as its opponents loudly wail, is, in
truth, a tremendous aid to them which, investigation shows,
they appreciate.
Just why the House should pass this revolutionary meas-
ure must be left to conjecture. No organized body either agri-
cultural, industrial, commercial or professional demanded it.
No suggestion that this House intended such a change ap-
peared in the press. We may surnise that some second-rate
lawyer when engaged in the trial of a jury case in a federal
court had his laboriously constructed ballyhoo rendered in-
effective by a few common sense remarks by the trial judge,
and, on his election to the lower house, thought to "get
even." There is a kind of lawyer who becomes annoyed, even
enraged, when compelled by the judge to try the real issues
in the case rather than indulge in attractive humbug and
eloquent ravings over things nobody denies. By long prac-
tice, they have acquired the art of verbalizing a myth into
the semblance of a reality, and bitterly resent the right to
ply their sorry trade. All these would favor such a bill as
H. R. 4721.
The House Judiciary Committee to which this bill, of
course, was referred held no hearings. The true nature of
the bill was disguised by a misleading title for which a new
title was substituted revealing its true purpose, but after its
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passage. The proceedings leading up to its passage appear
at page 7913 of the Congressional Record, occupy little more
than a half column and consume but thirty-seven seconds to
read. Thus did this Bill, abolishing one of the most impor-
tant functions of federal trial judges, pass the House.
Honorable Merrill E. Otis, United States District Judge
for the Western District of Missouri, delivered an address on
the subject before the State Bar of California at Del Monte
on September 10, 1937, which has been published, and from
which this writer gets the facts contained in this article.
Judge Otis' address, together with the facts assembled in the
appendix thereto, is an admirable, scholarly, and persuasive
production. It goes into the Federal Reporter to find how
much complaint there has been from litigants defeated in the
district court in criminal cases of the comments of the trial
judge to the jury upon the evidence. From this search, it
appears that out of 5,781 defendants convicted in district
court, only 85 complained that the trial judge had abused
his right to comment upon the evidence. And of this num-
ber of such complaints 30 were sustained and the convictions
reversed. Surely this fine record is sufficient to convince any
fair-minded man that the abuse of this power of comment
by federal judges has been negligible.
As everyone knows, the cardinal rule of statutory con-
struction observed by courts is to ascertain the legislative
intent, and this is usually done by discovering the evil
sought to be remedied. What was the "evil" at which H. R.
4721 was directed? Obviously, the only possible evil would
be that the federal district judges had abused the power
given them to "advise the jury upon the facts," and thereby
had invaded the special province of the jury. That there
would be occasional abuses of this power is to be expected,
since judges, being only human, are bound to err. Indeed,
the principal function of all appellate courts is to discover
and, as far as possible, to rectify substantial errors com-
mitted by judges of trial courts. In preparing his splendid
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address to the California lawyers, Judge Otis did not con-
tent himself with generalizations but had taken pains to as-
certain the extent of the abuse of this power. In doing this,
he had his assistant examine the record of all the jury cases
which had been appealed from the federal district courts to
the Circuit Courts of Appeal from November 1, 1924, to
January 1, 1937,- a period of 12 years and two months,-
appearing in Federal Reporter, Second Series, Volumes 1 to
85, inclusive. That investigation revealed the following im-
pressive facts:
In that period, as before stated, of 5,781 criminal cases
tried to juries and appealed by the convicted defendant in
only 85 cases was there even complaint that the power of
the judge to advise the jury as to the facts in any way had
been abused. And of these 85 cases the judge's charge was
approved in 53, held reversible error in 30, and merely criti-
cized in two cases. During the same period, it was discovered
that of 1,825 civil cases tried by juries (estimate) and ap-
pealed, in only 19 cases did the appellant even criticize the
trial judge's charge, and of these 19, the charge was ap-
proved in seven, and held reversible error in 11 cases. It thus
appears that, in a total of 7,606 jury cases in which the de-
feated party in the district court appealed from the decision,
he complained of the judge's charge to the jury in only 104
cases, and his complaint was held well-grounded in only 41
cases. During a 12-year period in the trial of over 7,000
cases, this power of the judge to advise the jury as to the
facts had been abused only 41 times and the injured party
had been granted a new trial on account of it. This is the
monstrous "evil" which the lower house of our national legis-
lature took it upon itself to correct by putting a gag in the
mouth of the trial judge. It is as if a Big Bertha were used
to kill a mosquito! Only 104 of over 7,000 actual litigants
complained, yet the lower house, by passing H. R. 4721,
sought to change an ancient rule that has proved most salu-
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tary in the trial of jury cases in federal courts. It is to be
hoped that the Senate will exhibit more common sense.
The House Judiciary Committee held no hearings. Its fa-
vorable report declared that the committee "considered" the
bill. The particular quality and method of its consideration
is well evidenced by its quotations from two decisions by in-
ferior federal courts as follows:
"The great vice of the rule which permits judges to discuss the
weight of the evidence, as it appears to us, is that the courts hold 'that
opinion. upon evidence by the court, cannot be held as taking a case
from the jury.' ;)1
"And the courts in upholding this privilege of the court to express
its opinions of the evidence, has even gone so far as to hold that 'what-
ever expression the court may have made, is not reviewable error.' "12
In the first above case, the judge writing the opinion pro-
fesses to have discovered a "great vice of the rule." In the
second, the statement that "whatever expression the court
may have made is not reviewable error," is simply untrue.
If the learned author of this committee report had made the
most casual investigation, he would have found that the Su-
preme Court of the United States, beginning with Start v.
United States,8 has often declared that what the trial judge
says to the jury touching the fact is reviewable. And if the
author of that committee report will turn to pages 30 to 33
of Judge Otis' address, he will find the titles of cases and
volumes and pages where they may be found in which the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal during the past
twelve years have reviewed what the trial judge has said to
the jury to ascertain whether his remarks were prejudicial
to the defeated party.
1 Citing Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Bloomer, 146 Fed. 720, 722 (C. C. A. 3rd
1906).
2 Citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. Thomas, 152 Fed. 365, 371 (C. C. A. 8th
1907).
3 153 U. S. 614 (1894).
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Yet this Bill passed the House without a dissenting voice
or vote! And here is the point at which Judge Otis' remarks
quoted below seem most appropriate:
"If in America's under.world there is a parliament, made up of rep-
resentatives of crime and vice and greed for what other men possess,
if in America's underworld there is a parliament, if this bill is intro-
duced in that parliament, it will pass there too without dissenting voice
or vote, aye with a shout of triumph it will pass, with such a shout as
will shake the very girders of the capitol!"
William M. Cain.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
